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Abstract
The state-owned electric utility, Korea Electricity Power Cooperation (KEPCO),
privatization has been a key word in South Korea since 1997, when the government
received $55 billion from the International Monetary Fund in exchange for a tough
economic restructuring that included massive privatization. The Korean government
separated KEPCO's six generation subsidiaries from KEPCO in 2001 in the initial process
of the privatization. However, the government has not taken any further action since then.
While there have been debates about the privatization of KEPCO, the debates were
political rather than economic. This thesis will investigate whether or not Korea should
continue to privatize KEPCO. First, it will examine how much revenue the government can
make by selling its shares of KEPCO. Second, this thesis will study how much investment
a privatized electricity industry will attract after privatization. Third, it will identify
whether the electricity price will go down if the government privatizes KEPCO. Fourth, it
will assess how the relationship between the government and the industry will change after
privatization. Finally, it will identify how much does the government and people have to
pay for the transition, which is caused by the change from a monopoly to a competitive
market. By comparing the advantages and the disadvantages, this thesis will decide
whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages. This thesis will discuss only economic
aspects; it will not examine the political, social and cultural aspects which are difficult to
measure objectively.
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Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION
Privatization has become a key word in both industrialized and developing countries
since the 1980s. Electric utilities have become one of the key areas of privatization because
of their enormous economic influence on national economies. Some developed countries
that respect competition, such as the United Kingdom, privatized their electric utilities and
introduced competition in the early 1990s. On the other hand, other developed countries,
including France, have kept government-owned electric utilities. Developing countries
have been privatizing government-owned electric utilities mainly to attract foreign
investments, enhance the quality of services, and lower prices.
Massive privatization of state-owned enterprises, including the Korea Electric Power
Corporation (KEPCO), was a part of Korea's economic restructuring after the 1997
currency crisis. The Korean government announced that it would receive $55billion from
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in exchange for a thorough economic restructuring
in December 1997 (Kim, 2002). The Korean government separated KEPCO's six
generation subsidiaries from KEPCO and established a wholesale electricity exchange
regime in 2001. However, it is difficult to say that Korea actually privatized KEPCO
because the government is still the major shareholder and influences most of KEPCO's
management; private parties, who own 40 percent of the shares, have little influence on
KEPCO management.
While the Korean government has not taken any further action since 2001, KEPCO's
privatization has long been a controversial issue. However, few studies have been
conducted to understand whether the country should fully privatize KEPCO. The debates
are always among politicians, government officials, government think-tanks or ordinary
people. For example, a presentation about KEPCO restructuring organized by a
government-supported research center, the Korea Development Institution (KDI), was
interrupted by the citizens from a provincial city. The citizens thought that a subsidiary of
KEPCO might not move to their town if KDI's research was accepted (Song, 2010).
This thesis will investigate whether Korean should privatize KEPCO. First, it will
examine how much revenue the government can make by selling its shares of KEPCO.
Second, this thesis will study how much investment the privatized electricity industry will
attract after the privatization. Third, it will identify whether the electricity price will go
down if the government privatizes KEPCO. Forth, it will identify whether the electricity
price will go down if the government privatizes KEPCO. Finally, it will identify how much
cost does the government and people have to pay for the transition cost, which caused by
change from monopoly to a competitive market. By comparing the advantages and the
disadvantages, this paper will decide whether the advantages outweigh the disadvantages.
This thesis will discuss only economic aspects; it will not examine the political, social and
cultural aspects which are difficult to measure objectively.
Chapter2: THE MEANING OF KEPCO PRIVATIZATION
2.1. Laws regulating Korean electricity service
Korean law regarding electricity business is the Electricity Business Act. All kinds
of electricity businesses, such as generation, transmission, distribution and retail services,
can enter the market under this law. However, all new entrants have to obtain licenses,
which are subject to the government's discretion. The government has allowed only
KEPCO and its six power generation subsidiaries to enter the electricity market for several
decades.
The Korea Electric Power Cooperation Act stipulates the establishment, ownership
and business of KEPCO. According to the act, the Korean government owns more than 51%
of the company's assets and the Minister of Knowledge Economy exercises the
stockholder's right.
The Electricity Industry Restructuring Promotion Act was enacted to divide and
privatize KEPCO in 2000. However, this act lapsed in 2009, leaving no significant effect
other than establishing six power generation companies owned by KEPCO and a
government agency, which decides real-time electricity market price. This change can
hardly be regarded as the introduction of competition because the six companies are
KEPCO's subsidiary companies.
Many acts are related to electricity services such as the Electricity Business in Rural
Area Act, the Renewable Energy Act and the Collective Electricity Business Act. These
acts are not studied in this thesis because they are not directly related KEPCO privatization.
2.2. KEPCO
KEPCO is a typical public company owned and operated by the government. The
government owns more than 51% of the total shares and has designated the Minister of
Knowledge Economy to oversee its running. The CEO is nominated by the Minister of
Knowledge Economy and appointed by the President.
KEPCO has an enormous influence on the South Korean economy, as almost all
Koreans have to buy electricity from this company. KEPCO is also important as the second
biggest company in terms of assets, and eleventh biggest company in terms of market value
in the country. Its annual sales, which were 33.6 trillion Korean Won (w33.6 trillion)' in
2009, represent more than three percent of Korean GDP (see [Figure 1]).
[Figure 1] Annual sales of KEPCO
Unit: W billion
2,006 2,007 2,008 2,009
Annual Sales 27,408 29,137 31,560 33,993
Annual Profit 3,394 2,821 -2,798 1,714
Total Asset 77,435 82,928 88,198 93,208
Total Debt 34,200 38,661 46,923 51,804
Total Equity 43,235 44,266 41,274 41,403
Source: Financial Supervisory Service (http://dart.fss.or.kr/dsaf001/main.do)
KEPCO is comprised of the main company, which runs transmission and distribution
and retail services, and numerous subsidiaries including generation and foreign businesses.
KEPCO owns the six biggest power generating companies, such as Korea Hydropower &
Nuclear Power Co, Korea East West Power Co and Korea South East Power Co. KEPCO
also owns other electricity business entities such as Korea Nuclear Fuel Co, KNOC
Nigerian East Oil Co, and Korea Electric Power Data Network Ltd (see [Exhibit 1]).
1W33.6 trillion is about $30.1 billion.
The exchange rate between US dollar and Korean Won was 1 and 1,115 on March 9, 2011.
2.3 KEPCO operation (Electricity market operation )2
Every nation has generators, transmitters, distributors and retailers in its electricity
market. As of 2009, Korea has 405 generation organizations including 380 generation
business entities and 25 regional, collective and self generators. However, only KEPCO's
six generation subsidiaries have meaningful market share. In 2009, they owned 82% of the
capacity and generated 94% of the country's electricity generation (See [Figure 2]). Other
companies' power generation increased from 4.66% of total generation in 2002 to only
6.19% in 2009. Transmission, distribution and retail services are monopolized by KEPCO
(MKE, 2011a).
[Figure 2] Total generation and generation capacity by companies
Generation (MWh)
1981 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2009
Total Generation 44,088,303 62,667,201 118,460,795 203,546,465 290,442,948 389,479,512 454,317,296
KEPCO & 37,428,005 56,179,998 103,184,998 179,073,203 256,841,584 349,758,383 406,779,556Subsidiaries
Others 2,778,660 1,754,007 4,206,029 4,032,626 4,836,511 11,448,962 18,350,447Companies _________________________
Group & - - 3,162,645 7,617,607Alternative
Non-Utili in 3,881,638 4,733,196 11,067,768 20,440,636 28,764,853 25,109,522 21,569,686Common e Us
Generation Capacity (kW)
Total Capacity 11,029,344 17,639,982 24,055,893 35,355,785 53,684,913 67,075,240 77,661,844
KEPCO & 9,130,58C 15,013,903 19,782,833 30,561,633 44,566,083 55,956,412 63,962,287Subsidiaries
Others 704,800 1,122,800 1,238,290 1,622,240 3,884,634 4,764,663 6,761,354
Cornies ______________________________
Aterative . - - - - 1,537,122 2,746,337
onUtiliZ in 1 193,96 1,503,279 3,034,771 3,171,912 5,234,196 4,817,043 4,191,866CommonUse__________________________________________
Source: MKE, 2011a
2 As KEPCO is the only transmission, distribution and retail service provider and the
owner of the six biggest generation companies, KEPCO operation might be regarded as the
electricity market operation. In 2.1.3, both KEPCO and electricity market will be regarded
as the same.
In 2009, KEPCO supplied electricity services to 18.908 million customers with
394,475GWh (see [Figure 3]). The average retail price for residential service was 98.09
Korean Won per kilowatt-hour (w/kWh), and that of industrial service was 73.69 w/kWh
in 2009 (KEPCO, 2010). According to the International Energy Agency, the price of
electricity in Korea is among the cheapest in the world. Retail electricity price in Korea is
0.089 US Dollar per kilowatt-hour ($/kWh), followed by Thailand (0.094 $/kWh), Mexico
(0.096 $/kWh), United States (0.113 $/kWh), France (0.169 $/kWh), United Kingdom
(0.231 $/kWh) and Japan (0.206 $/kWh) (see [Exhibit 11]).
[Figure 3] KEPCO sales by customers
Number of Total sales sales per customer Total consumption
Customers (thousand won) (thousand won) (GWh, %)
Residential 11,298,000 6,613,500,000 585 57,596(15%)
Public & Service 6,007,000 12,099,700,000 2,014 139,135(35%)
Industrial 1,422,000 14,261,800,000 10,029 197,744(50%)
Total 18,727,000 32,975,000,000 1,761 394,475(100%)
Source: KEPCO, 2010
KEPCO's mid-term and short-term operation plans as well as long-term investment
plans are hugely influenced by the government. Long-term plans, such as building new
power plants and new high voltage transmission lines, are developed not by KEPCO but by
the government itself. The Electricity Business Act stipulates that "the Minister of
Knowledge Economy shall adapt fundamental and comprehensive measures to promote
stability of the supply and demand of electricity and the comprehensiveness of electricity
business" (Article 3) and that "the Minister of Knowledge Economy shall determine the
definite contents of universal supply of electricity" (Article 6). KEPCO, on the other hand,
manages electricity supply to protect consumers (Article 4) and the environment (Article 5).
The "Fifth basic plan for the electricity supply," which was announced by the
government in 2010, is a good example of a government-initiated long-term plan.
According to this plan, the government anticipated that the electricity demand would grow
1.9% annually from 2010 to 2024. Based on this anticipation, the government announced
that it will build 14 nuclear power plants, 15 coal power plants, 19 gas plants and 8,036km
of transmission line by 2024 (MKE, 20 1Ob).
Mid- term plans, such as maintenance scheduling, fuel purchasing plans and retail
price adjustment, are left to KEPCO. However, the government can influence the mid-
term plan through a CEO appointed by the President or the Board of Directors, which is
directed by the Minister of Knowledge Economy. For example, although KEPCO has the
nominal authority to decide electricity price, the 2010 Ministry of Knowledge Economy
Business Plan reported that it would change the retail price structure (MKE, 2011 a).
Article 17 of KEPCO Act stipulates that "The electric utility bill --- shall include details of
the utility charges specified by their items in such manner as determined by the Ordinance
of the Ministry of Knowledge Economy."
In its short term plans and daily businesses, KEPCO has autonomy. However, its
operations related to stable and efficient services are strictly regulated by the government.
Even the rule of electricity trade between generators and KEPCO is set by a government
agency, the Korea Power Exchange (KPE). The Electricity Business Act stipulates that all
electricity business entities have to sell and buy electricity through KPE (Article 31). The
exchange volume and bidding price are set by KPE. The generators and retailers have no
input into this decision-making process. In this system, KPE decides how much electricity
should be generated by which generators, selected from the cheapest to the most expensive.
The wholesale prices of each type of generator, such as nuclear, coal and gas, are set by
KPE regularly. In sum, KEPCO and KEPCO's generation subsidiaries have no choice but
to buy and sell electricity with the quantity and price decided by KPE.
2.4 Privatization
Generally speaking, "privatization" refers to selling government-owned public
companies to private parties. In the past several decades, privatization has been
implemented by selling government shares to reduce the government's ownership portion
of a company. For example, the Korean government privatized numerous public companies
such as Pohang Iron and Steel Cooperation and Korea Telecom by selling its shares on the
domestic and international stock markets in 2000.
Public ownership of a company is based on a monopoly system and a great number
of government regulations on the public company. Privatization, on the other hand, is
based on a market competition and a new set of regulations that guarantee competition. In
many cases, however, publicly owned companies compete with other companies in the
market. It is also possible that a private company monopolizes a market and takes a great
number of regulations. In many cases, introducing competition and developing new
regulations for the competitive market follows privatization. At the same time, the
government has to reduce previous regulations on the newly privatized company to
implement privatization successfully.
Privatization does not merely mean selling government's shares of a company on
stock markets. The government should decrease or abolish regulations of the newly-
privatized company. In some cases -- for example, if a newly-privatized company is in a
competitive market -- the government does not need to regulate the company anymore. No
investors will buy the shares of a newly privatized company if the government insists on
too much regulation on the company. In many cases, selling government shares to the
private sector occurs concurrently with reducing regulation on the company. For example,
the Korean government gave up many regulations, such as designating the CEO, when it
privatized one of its state owned companies, Korea Telecom.
Another important feature of privatization is that the government should introduce
competition in the market, where the newly-privatized companies have monopolistic power.
Regulators believe that the newcomers in the market can prevent the newly-privatized
company from abusing monopolistic power. In other words, the checks and balances of the
competitors will guarantee the socially desirable price and output of the market. For
example, when the Korean government privatized the telecommunication company in 1997,
it also issued a license to the second land-line telecommunication service provider, Hanaro
Telecom. In this way, two companies were created, adding competitiveness to the
telecommunication market.
The last step in privatization is developing new regulations for competitive markets,
which were not necessary when the government owned and governed the company. This is
because a newly-privatized company may have too much monopolistic market power. The
newly privatized company might abuse its power and push its competitors out. A newly
privatized company, which has all infrastructure, discriminate newly created companies
which has less infrastructure. To guarantee competition between newcomers and the
newly-privatized company which owns infrastructure, the government has to mandate they
share the infrastructure. For example, when the Korean government privatized a public
telecommunication company, it developed a new regulation. Under the regulation, the
newly privatized company was regulated to share its infrastructures, such as ducts, cables,
poles, or station buildings, with other service providers (Telecommunications Business Act,
Article 34-3).
2.5 Electricity privatization
Although there are many types of electricity privatization, MIT economist Paul L.
Joskow argues that there are common characteristics (Joskow, 2006). First, privatizations
of state-owned utilities decrease political influences on the utilities and increase incentives
for their performance. Second, vertically integrated utilities are separated into competitive
businesses: generation, transmission, distribution, retail and so on. The separation can be
done by dividing a utility into several small companies, or by separately auditing several
parts of one company. Third, enough generators should enter and compete in the market to
ensure competitive market output. In this point, setting few big markets would be better
idea to enhance competition than setting a lot of small markets. Fourth, transmission
networks should be integrated to encompass all the wholesale generators. An independent
system operator should manage the operation to ensure the stable and fair operation of the
whole network. Fifth, competitive spot wholesale markets 3 should be built to support the
real time balancing of supply and demand. The competitive spot markets can enhance the
system reliability by efficiently responding to unplanned events. Sixth, transparent rules
that assure generators to efficiently access to transmission systems should be built to
guarantee the fair competition. Seventh, customer bills for the amount of electricity usage
3 Generators can sell electricity with long-term contract or spot market. Spot market refers to day-ahead and
real time markets.
and delivery costs should be divided so that customers can choose their retail service
providers. Eighth, an independent regulator should be established. This regulator should
have enough information about costs and performances of firms to enforce adequate
obligations with the information. Lastly, the government should develop transition
mechanisms of a privatization process. For example, the government should decide how to
compensate owners of old and inefficient generators, which will not be used in the
competitive market.
2.6 KEPCO privatization
KEPCO privatization has been an issue since the 1997 financial crisis in Korea. In
November 1997, Korea's foreign currencies were exhausted because of the massive
withdrawal of foreign currency. Many foreign investors believed that Korea, following
Thailand and Indonesia, could not repay its foreign debts. Because the Korean central bank
had not enough foreign currencies, the Korean government had to borrow them from the
International Monetary Fund. The Korean government had to fundamentally change its
economic system to obtain the financial support. As part of the fundamental changes, the
government privatized five of the eleven largest state-owned enterprises and 61 out of the
108 state-owned companies from 1998 to 2000. As hoped, foreign investment in Korea
returned, indeed very quickly, from less than US$2 billion in 1995 to US$15.7 billion in
2000.
Korea agreed to privatize KEPCO as a part of the large privatization in the late
1990s. The Korean government created KEPCO's six generation subsidiaries. The
government also established the Korea Power Exchange to introduce a wholesale
electricity market mechanism and the Korea Electricity Commission to introduce an
independent electricity market regulator (Byrne et al, 2004).
A Korean government official has stated that Korea had tried to sell one of the six
KEPCO generation subsidiaries in the early 2000s. However, Korea gave up the plan for
four reasons. The first reason was that the generation company, whose assets were 5,468
billion Korean won (4,755 million US dollars), was too big to find a new owner. Second,
few investors were interested in the generation company because its profit was too small.
Third, the Western Energy Crisis of 2000 and 2001 negatively influenced the policy
makers' attitudes on privatization. Finally, the president in the early 2000s did not want too
many privatizations (O.H. Lee, Senior Deputy Director of MKE, personal communication,
Feb, 2011).
It is difficult to say that Korea actually privatized KEPCO. Although the Korean
government regards KEPCO as partly privatized, it retains a great deal of influence. First,
the government is still the major shareholder and it sets most strategic plans, such as
building new power plants. Even though private parties own 40 percent of the shares, they
usually do not influence KEPCO's long-term plan. The second reason is that there is no
market competition among KEPCO and its six generation subsidiaries. Even though
KEPCO is separate from six generation subsidiaries, and trades with them, prices and
quantities are decided by another government agency, the Korea Power Exchange. The last
reason is there are few possibilities for new and significant entry into the market. This is
because the electricity price in Korea is very low and the government always sets the price
close to the marginal generation cost.
Chapter3: THE EXPERICENCES OF ELECTRICITY PRIVATIZATION
3.1. Chile
Chile is the first country in the world that privatized its state-owned electric utilities.
The Chilean government established the competitive electricity market by enacting the
General Law of Electric Services in 1982 and privatized state-owned electric utilities after
1986 (Pollitt, 2004). Many researchers and policy makers are studying the effects of the
Chilean privatization because the country accumulated a lot of experience.
Power generation in Chile is organized by four grid systems: SING, SIC, AYSEN
and MAGALLANES. SING, the northern grid, accounts for 26% of national generation
and 6.21% of population coverage. SIC, the central region's grid, accounts for 73% of
national generation and 92% of population coverage. AYSEN and MAGALLANES,
southern region's grids, cover 0.6% of generation and 1.54% of the population. Gas (2,111
MW of capacity) is the main source of generation resource in the SING area while hydro-
power is the biggest power source (5,322.9 MW of capacity) followed by gas generation
(2,732 MW of capacity) in the SIC area (see [Figure 4]) (CDEC-SIC, 2011).
[Figure 4] Power system installation (MW) in Chile as of December 31, 2009
System Thermal Hydro Wind-
Coal Oil Gas Others Run of the River Dam Power
SING 1,215 358 2,117 0 12 0 0
SIC 1,071 2,089 2,733 105 1597 3,725 82
AYSEN 0 20 0 0 6 11 2
MAGALLANES 0 14 84 0 0 0 0
Total 2,287 2,482 4,929 105 1,617 3,736 84
Source: CDEC-SIC, 2011
The background of Chilean electricity reform was laid when General Pinochet seized
the government power by a military coup in 1973. The military government pursued neo-
liberal ideas inspired by Chicago economists while mercilessly suppressing democratic
movements. Many public companies, which had been nationalized by the former regime,
were returned to their previous owners under the Pinochet regime. Large state owned
companies, including electricity companies, were forced to trade on a commercial basis
(Pollitt, 2004).
The General Law of Electric Services, which was enacted in 1982 and is still in
place, laid the foundation of privately owned electricity service providers. The law
considered power generation as a competitive business while regarding network service as
a natural monopoly. Transmission service is supposed to allow non-discriminatory access,
so that all generators can compete in the wholesale market. The law created an independent
system operator to coordinate the competitive generators in an open transmission network.
The law established two types of customers: regulated and free customers. Free customers,
whose maximum demand exceed 2MW, purchase electricity directly from generators with
negotiated prices. On the other hand, regulated customers, whose maximum demand does
not exceed 2MW, must purchase electricity from local distribution companies and pay
prices set by the government (Raineri, 2006)4.
The privatization started by dividing vertically integrated state-owned utilities into
several generation, transmission and distribution companies. Endesa, a state-owned
company, was divided into 6 generation companies, 6 distribution companies and 2 small
isolated companies. Chilectra, which controlled distribution in Santiago, was split into a
4 In 2009, sales at regulated prices were 56% (29,756 GWh) and sales at de-regulated
price were 44% (23,631 GWh) of total sales.
generation company (Gener) and two distribution companies (including Chilmetro).
Endesa, Gener and Chilmetro were sold to private parties between 1985 and 1989 (Pollitt,
2004).
Even though almost thirty years have passed, numerous positive and negative points
of views regarding the effect of the privatization exist. Some researchers argue that it was
successful because of more efficient operations, better quality of services and more local
electrifications. For example, competitive power-generation market attracted numerous
domestic and foreign investments in the Chilean electricity industry. Shareholder-
controlled generation companies grew from 11 in 1996 to 26 in 2000 (Center for Energy
Economics, 2000). The new entries dramatically increased the generation capacity in Chile.
The generation capacity in SIC grid grew from 2,713 MW in 1982 to 6991 MW in 2004
and that of SING grid grew from 428 in 1982 to 3,636 in 2004 (Pollitt, 2004). However, it
is not clear whether the improvement was because of utility privatization or other factors,
such as fast economic growth.
It is also unclear whether Chile's volatile electricity prices are because of
competitive markets or not. The SIC area, where hydropower is the main source of
electricity, experienced high electricity prices when there were droughts after the
privatization. The SING area, where natural gas is the main source of generation fuels, has
experienced high prices since Argentina reduced its gas exports to Chile in the 2000s.
These problems are related to external problems rather than the endogenous problems of
electricity privatization.
3.2. United Kingdom
According to a UK economist, Steven Thomas, the reason for the UK's electricity
privatization was not apparent. The UK's electricity service quality was satisfactory, the
price was not too expensive and the investments were financed without significant
problems. He argues that there were three reasons. First the UK government could generate
£5 billion per year income tax and E15 billion for privatization. The other reasons, he
argues, were widening the share of ownership for the electric utilities and breaking the
political power of trade unions (Thomas, 2005).
The state-owned Central Electricity Generating Board (CEGB) monopolized the
English and Welsh electricity generation and transmission from 1957 to the early 1990s.
Distribution and retail services were provided by twelve regional electricity boards. The
privatization started from dividing a big state-owned electric utility into several small
companies and selling the small companies to private parties. The Electricity Act of 1989
stipulated that CEGB should be divided into National Grid and three generation companies:
National Power, PowerGen and later Nuclear Electric. National Grid assumed ownership
and control of the transmission system and two pumped hydro-power plants, which were
subsequently sold off. Currently, National Grid is England and Wales' transmission service
provider, which physically builds and operates transmission lines. These four new state-
owned companies were privatized after the division (Newberry & Pollitt, 1997).
Currently, the generation market is quite competitive because of many small
generators. In 1990, three generation companies supplied 100% of electricity. However,
these three companies, or their successors, supplied merely 37.6% of electricity in 2004
(see [Figure 5]).
[Figure 5] Power generators in England and Wales
1990 (Capacity GW) 2004 (Capacity GW)
National Power 30 British Energy 9.6
Power Gen 20 Ingony 8.0
Nuclear Electric 8 PowerGen 8.3






Plants Reprocessed by Banks, etc 7.9
Plants for sale 6.3
Total 68.9
Source: Thomas, 2005
Twelve Regional Electricity Boards supplied retail and distribution services for their
regions before the 1990s. Retail competition, in which customers can buy their electric
power directly from generators, started with the 1989 Electricity Act. Retail competition
was allowed only for customers with more than 1 MW demand initially. This condition
increased for customers with above 100 KW demand in 1994. Finally, the limitation was
abolished in 1998 and every retail customer could choose his/her retailer (Newberry &
Pollitt, 1997).
Today, the former state-owned regional companies supplies 11.9 million customers
(46%) while independent companies supplies 15 million customers (54%). However, there
are big differences among regions; 83% of electricity in South-Wales is offered by the
former public companies while merely 30% of electricity in North-Eastern region is
offered by independent companies (UK Department of Energy & Climate Change, 2010).
There is no consensus about whether the privatization in Britain reduced prices or
not. Some researchers argue that the competitive market caused a sharp decrease in retail
prices. The prices in London, which is a competitive electricity market, decreased more
than that of Edinburgh, which is a traditional regulated market. The domestic electricity
price in London was 11 pence per kilowatt hour while that of Edinburgh was 10 in 1990.
However, the price in London was 7 pence per kilowatt hour while that of Edinburgh was 8
in 2004 (Dubash & Singh, 2006).
On the other hand, there are critiques that privatization did not decrease prices
because of two reasons. Stephen Thomas (2005) argues that the electricity competition did
not offer benefits to small consumers. Although cost reductions of one or two percents for
large consumers are worthwhile, small percent savings for small consumers are negligible.
The other claim is that retailers allocate cheaply purchased electricity to large consumers
and expensively purchased electricity to small consumers, who can not choose their
electricity suppliers. This phenomenon happens more frequently when small consumers are
more captive and large consumers are not. According to Power UK, wholesale electricity
price went down 35 percent from 1999 to 2002 and retail prices for the large consumers
went down 22 percent. However, the price for small consumers went down merely 5
percent (Thomas, 2005).
3.3. United States of America
3.3.1. The history of regulation
The US government's electricity regulation was focused on regional monopolies
before 1992. Some states, including New York, California and Massachusetts, introduced
wholesale and retail competition after the federal government enacted the Energy Policy
Act in 1992. However, most states are no longer interested in competitive electricity
market after the 2001/2001 Western Energy Crisis.
The federal government introduced the first federal level of electricity regulation by
enacting Public Utility Holding Company Act in 1935 (PUHCA). Before PUHCA,
privately owned electric utilities provided most of the US electricity; they provided 94
percent of total generation and 16 largest electric power conglomerates controlled three
quarters of total generation. The unregulated electric power conglomerates created
problems such as abusing market power to increase electricity prices, which eventually
increased their revenues. The bigger problem of the electric power conglomerates was the
weak ownership structures; one holding company acquired numerous subsidiaries to
broaden their influence. This weak structure proved problematic in the 1930s when stock
prices plummeted. A problem of a subsidiary could spread to the entire conglomerates,
which caused the conglomerate to collapse (Energy Information Administration (EIA),
2000).
The first regulation by PUHCA was that electric utilities had to operate on a
vertically integrated basis within contiguous states. The utilities could not diversify into
non-utility businesses and the non-utilities could not enter the electricity generation market.
For decades, from the 1930s to the 1990s, utilities could supply cheap electricity with
decreasing prices. Economies of scale were achieved through new generation capacity
investment, technological advances, and declining costs (EIA, 2000).
A number of national movements have stimulated a more competitive electricity
market after the oil sanctions in the 1970s. The Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of
1978 (PURPA), whose original goal was to increase renewable energies, prompted
competitive wholesale electricity markets. Before PURPA, only utilities could own and
operate electric power plants; PURPA stipulated that utilities shall buy power from non-
utilities, most of which were renewable energy producers (EIA, 2000).
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPA) advanced competition in generation by
allowing Independent Power Producers and by ensuring transmission access for
independent power producers. Independent Power Producers are generation companies that
generate and sell electricity in the wholesale market. The Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC) order 888 and 889 has significantly changed the transmission
services from monopoly to competition. The FERC order 888 of 1996 established the
principle that all public utilities have to allow generators to use their transmissions with
non-discriminatory tariffs and not-discriminatory terms and conditions. The FERC order
889 of 1997stipulated the rules regarding transmission information networks and standards
of conduct to guarantee the non-discriminatory open transmission (Joskow, 2003).
Electric utilities were required to implement generation restructuring by selling their
generation capacity to other companies or by separating their generation department from
non-competitive businesses such as transmission and distribution. Sixty-three percent of
utilities followed the first way and 37% of utilities followed the second from 1998 to 2002.
Massachusetts, New York and California were the first few states that implemented
competition programs. These states required their utilities to divest substantial amount of
their generating capacity through an auction process. Other states, such as Pennsylvania,
Maryland and Texas, required the utilities to establish unregulated wholesale power
affiliates within a holding company structure. However, generation restructuring has been
halted because no additional states introduced competition after the Western Energy Crisis
in 2000 and 2001 (Joskow, 2003).
3.3.2. Competition in generation service
In the United States, Independent Power Producers grew fast in the 1990s and the
early 2000s. Their net summer capacity was 25 percent of the total capacity of the US in
2003 while that of 1997 was merely two percent (see [figure 6]).
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Even though 36% of total US electricity is generated by independent power
producers in 2008, there are substantial differences among states. North-Eastern states,
such as New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts, have higher percentage of electricity
generation by Independent Power Producers. However, the wholesale electricity markets of
many other states, including Tennessee, Nebraska and South Carolina, are dominated by
traditional utilities (see [Exhibit 2]).
3.3.3. Competition in retail services
By 2008, 16 states, including Massachusetts, New York, Texas, and the District of
Columbia, had restructured retail electric service and allowed competitive suppliers to
provide service to some retail customers. These states require the utilities to continue to
offer default services to customers, mainly small commercial and residences, who do not
want a competitive service. Customers, mainly large commercial and industrial customers,
are able to purchase electricity from competitive suppliers other than their traditional
electric companies.
Two generation service options are available to consumers. One is Default Service,
which is provided by traditional utilities; the other is competitive generation service, which
is provided by competitive suppliers. The prices of the competitive services are determined
by the competitive market while those of the default service are under state government
regulation. Customers pay delivery service charges (A in [Figure 7]) which are
monopolized by utilities and generation charges (B in [Figure 7]) which are under
competition (competitive service) or traditional regional monopoly (Default Service).
[Figure 7] A sample bill from NSTAR (Jan, 2011)
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Competitive retail services have been slowly gaining market portion since the de-
regulation. Non-competitive generation was dominant in many states in 2000. For example,
non-competitive generation supplied electricity to 99.91% residential customers (99.81%
of residential consume) and to 86.56% large commercial and industrial customers (77.71%
of large commercial and industrial consume) in 2000. However, competitive generation
grew fast in many states on several years. For example, competitive generation supplied
electricity to 10.63% of residential customers (10.36% of residential consume) and to
74.57% of large commercial and industrial customers (89.90% of large commercial and
industrial consume) in Massachusetts in December 2008 (Massachusetts Division of
Energy Resources, each year).
3.3.4. The effect of deregulation on price
A number of states, whose electricity prices were higher than others, were the first to
introduce retail competition. Other states such as Kentucky and Idaho, whose rates are
among the lowest in the country, are not moving as quickly (see [exhibit 2]).
Electricity prices have been fluctuating since 1970. Between 1970 and 1985, national
average residential electricity prices more than tripled. Real retail electricity prices began
to fall after the mid-1980s until 2000-2001. The prices stayed flat through 2004, but have
begun to increase in all regions after 2004 (EIA, 2010) (see [figure 8]).
[Figure 8] US average retail prices of electricity
By SCblNMFPl,1%#M ay soct, Reaf Pflu, 156-2500
52-Wan-
IM ias 197 190  SIS 1985 M 2XM M 0 ING 1 965 Wl 9 80 M 98 I 9NS IM 5 20M 205
Source: E IA, 2010, p.260
Some researches argue that the decreasing price trend in the 1980s and the 1990s
was because of market competition. For example, the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (2005, p.32) said that "In all of the countries that privatized
their state-owned electric utility, there is a clear trend showing that electricity prices fell for
industrial consumers. In the United States, this downward trend began in the early 1980s,
coinciding with the emergence of independent power producers as a first step to introduce
market competition." However, MIT economist Paul L. Joskow (2003, p.43) argues that
"there is very little information available to evaluate the price effects of retail competition
in the US. It would be too hasty to conclude that competition causes market price decrease
by using merely time series data." Generally speaking, electricity prices are mainly
influenced by fuel, especially gas and oil, prices. Both electricity prices and fuel prices
went up in the 1970s and the 2000s while they went down in the 1980s and the 1990s.
To truly understand the effect of competition, difference-in-difference analysis
should be applied. If we compare the average retail prices between those states that have
competitive retail markets and those that do not have them, we can see that competitive
markets' average retail prices are higher than those of the other states (See [exhibit 4-1]).
When comparing the increasing level of the prices in the 16 states and the other
states, the 16 states' increasing level is higher than that of the other states; they grew 50.5%
between 2000 and 2010 while the other states grew 33% in the same period (see [exhibit 4-
2] to [exhibit 4-6]).
Some might argue that utilities charged more for the less competitive residential
service and charged less for the more competitive commercial and industrial services. If
they did so, the relative prices of commercial and industrial prices would be lower in the
competitive markets. However, the price data implies that there is little possibility of such
actions. The relative prices of commercial service between the 16 states and the other states
have no specific trend in the last 20 years (see [exhibit 4-7] to [exhibit 4-8]). The relative
price of industrial service in the 16 states, which are more competitive services in
competitive markets, increased much faster than other states (see [exhibit 4-9] to [exhibit
4-10]). This implies that the competition in the 16 states did not decrease the relative prices
of industrial electricity service.
Chapter4: SHOULD KOREA PRIVATIZE KEPCO?
4.1 Cost and benefit method
Whenever a government develops a policy, it measures the expected costs and
benefits of the policy. This thesis tries to measure the economic costs and benefits.
Because measuring economic effects is easier and more objective than measuring political
or social effects, this thesis is going to investigate in only economic matters.
The first benefit and cost from privatization is caused by ownership change from
government to private parties. As the public electric utility is one of the biggest companies
in Korea, the government could make good revenue from domestic and foreign investors.
This thesis also investigates what the government has to give up.
The second benefit is increased investment in electricity, which will eventually
lower electricity prices. This thesis will investigate foreign countries that privatized their
state-owned electricity, to find out whether their investment increased or not. This paper
will also examine how KEPCO attracted investment and anticipate how the newly-
privatized electric company will attract investment.
The third issue is whether private ownership or competition caused by privatization
will decrease electricity prices. This paper will study the UK, which privatized its state-
owned electric utility in the early 1990s and the USA, which introduced competition in its
generation and retail markets.
The forth issue is transition cost. This thesis studies the relationship change between
government and private industry. Because KEPCO has been an important government
policy tool for economic development, its privatization might affect the economic
development of Korea. This paper particularly will focus on the nuclear power industry,
which is regarded as one of the most popular economic policies in Korea.
The last issue is transition cost, such as incomplete competition and inadequate
coordination. This thesis probes 2000/2001 Western Energy Crisis and the 2003 North-
East America blackout. This paper also tries to anticipate whether the two kinds of
transition problems can happen in Korea in the process of KEPCO privatization.
4.2 Ownership change
The first and most evident benefit from the sales of KEPCO is government revenue.
In other words, the Korean government can make W9,469 billion ($8,481 million) if it
sells its shares of KEPCO6 . Nine point five trillion Korean Won is an enormous amount of
money on the scale of the South Korean economy, whose GDP was wl,063 trillion in 2010.
The government might repay 3.05% of the public debt, w309 trillion as of December 2010,
if it sells all of its KEPCO stock.
When it sold 21% of KEPCO stock in August 1989 and 34% of POSCO shares in
April 1988, the Korean government made a great deal of money (Song & Song, 1992). The
government made 2.5 times more money by selling its shares in 1989 rather than selling in
1998 because the stock price was 2.5 times higher in 1988 and 1989 than in 1998 (see
[Figure 9]).
s $1 was W1,116 in Feb 16, 2011 (source: the Bank of Korea website)
6 KEPCO's total stock price was W18,541 billion and the government owns 51.07% of the
share as of Feb 16, 2011 (source : the Korea Stock Exchange website)
[Figure 9] Korean composite stock index from 1980 to 2004
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Korea has a successful record of obtaining foreign currencies by selling its most
lucrative public companies. After the 1997 foreign exchange crisis, Korea had to privatize
11 public companies, such as POSCO, which is one of the world's biggest steel makers,
and KT, which is the biggest domestic telecommunication conglomerate in the country.
However, Korea sold its POSCO shares in 1998 and 1999 when the stock price was lower
than 10 years had been before and 10 years had been after (Korean government, 1999 and
2000). The bigger problem was that eight percent of POSCO shares were sold in the
international stock market in 1999 when the stock was cheap and Korean currency was
extremely cheap. The experience of KT stock selling in the world market was better than
that of POSCO. KT stock sold for 20% more expensive on NYSE than on the domestic
market, and the total price sold on NYSE was $2,485 million (Jin, 2006).
If the Korean government sells its shares of KEPCO, it would have to give up the
whole ownership of KEPCO and KEPOC's numerous subsidiaries. The problem is that the
government might give up the w93.2 trillion worth of public companies while earning
merely W9.47 trillion. In other words, the government might gain A while losing B (see
[figure 10]). This is because of KEPCO's total assets are much bigger than its share values.
In sum, KEPCO privatization means the ownership change of all generation, transmission
and distribution lines that Korea has built for more than a century. Furthermore, the
government also has to give up its control over the subsidiaries of KEPCO, whose assets
are w30.3 trillion. The subsidiaries are not only generation companies but also numerous
lucrative companies: Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power Co., which has accumulated several
decades of Nuclear power plant operation and is making billions of dollars by selling its
know-how to foreign countries, and KEPCO International Hong Kong Ltd., which has
been investing in the promising Chinese electricity market. (see [Exhibit 1]).
[Figure 10] Government gain and loss from KEPCO sales
O KEPCO's Total Asset : W93.2 trillion B: Government loss
O 12.8% (w9.5 trillion) is owned by the government
One concern is whether the government should sell its KEPCO shares to
conglomerates, foreigners, or the general public. The ramifications of new owners on
social welfare are another concern of privatization.
The simple way to privatize KEPCO is by selling the government's shares to private
companies. However, KEPCO is too big to find a new owner; it is the second biggest
company in terms of asset values and twelfth biggest company in terms of market values
(see [Exhibit 5]). Selling one of the generation subsidiaries of KEPCO is practically
difficult as well. For example, in the early 2000s, the Korean government tried to sell one
of the generation subsidiaries but failed. The first reason for the failure is that the divided
generation subsidiaries are still too big to find a new owner who has enough financial
capability. Each generation subsidiary has approximately W2.1 to w2.6 trillion assets.
Assuming that companies with market values bigger than w 10 trillion can merge the
KEPCO generation subsidiaries, only 21 companies have the capability. The number
decreases to seven assuming that companies that have more than w20 trillion of market
value can acquire the KEPCO generation subsidiaries. Only seven non-financial companies'
market values are more than W20 trillion and 21 non-financial companies' values exceed w
10 trillion (see [Exhibit 5]).
Considering the ownership structure of the 21 companies, only eight conglomerates
are truly separate companies: Samsung, Hyundai, POSCO, LG, SK, S-Oil, Lotte Shopping
and Honam Petrolium. This is because of the "chaebol" 7 ownership structure in Korea;
Hyundai chaebol owns Hyundai Motors, Hyundai Mobis and Kia Motors; Samsung
chaebol owns Samsung Electronics, Samsung Electro Mechanics, and Samsung
Construction & Trading.
In short, if the government insists on domestic buyers, it must sell KEPCO to
chaebols. However, it is not an economically good option to increase the chaebols'
economic power, which is already very strong.
Another option is that the government sells its KEPCO shares to private individuals.
By doing this, the government can prevent a small number of investors from dominating
the electricity market. Actually, the Korean government sold some of its shares of KEPCO
and POSCO in this way after the inauguration of new president Roh Tae-Woo in 1988
(Song and Song, 1992). President Roh promised to share the ownership of lucrative state-
owned companies by selling the government shares to the general public. In 1988, the
government sold 31 million POSCO shares to POSCO workers and general public at a
price of w 15 thousand for a share and w413 billion total. In 1999, the government also sold
7 A family-controlled industrial conglomerate in Korea
128 million KEPCO shares to KEPCO workers and the general public at a price of Wl3
thousand for a share and w 1,272 billion total. The government restricted the sales to low-
level workers of the public companies and low-income citizens. The buyers' assets might
have more than doubled right after the deal, because the market prices were two or three
times higher than the purchase price (compare column A and B in [figure 11]). However,
their asset values decreased to the purchase- price level two or three years after the
purchase, because the stock prices went down in the early 1990s (compare column C and D
in [figure 11]).
[Figure 11] Share prices of POSCO and KEPCO
Column A Column B Column C Column D
Purchase Price Market Price Highest Price Lowest Price
41,400 41,400 17,600
POSCO 15,000
(June, 1988) (June, 1988) (June, 1991)
23,000 26,000 13,000
KEPCO 13,000
(Aug., 1989) (Aug, 1989) (June, 1991)
Source: Song and Song, 1992
Although the sales did not generate the profits the government hoped for, the plan to
distribute the ownership of public companies was successful. This is because no one can
own more than 3% of shares of "public corporations" under the regulation of the Securities
and Exchange Act (Article 200). For example, more than 80% of POSCO shares are owned
by numerous, small-scale shareholders so that no one can significantly influence the
company's decision making. According to POSCO, 81.16% of its shares are owned by
numerous foreigners and personal stake holders, 5.08% by National Pension Service, 5.04%
by Nippon Steel Corporation, 5.97% by financial institutions, 2.85% by a
telecommunication company (POSCO, 2010).
4.3 Investment in electricity
Historically, KEPCO has offered stable and cheap electric power by obtaining
tremendous foreign investments. Before KEPCO was established in 1961, Korea
experienced severe electricity shortages. The total generation capacity was merely 74% of
the peak demand at that time (Kang, 2011). After the establishment of KEPCO, the Korean
government underwrote KEPCO's numerous loans from foreign countries, especially the
United States. For example, KEPCO borrowed $7.5 million from the US at a 0.75 percent
annual interest rate to build a transmission and distribution network in 1964 (MOFAT,
1964). KEPCO also borrowed $22.5 million from the US government at a one percent
annual interest rate to build 125MW thermal power plant in Seoul in 1966 (MOFAT, 1966).
In 1967, KEPCO borrowed $12.7 million for the second Transmission & Distribution
Project and $17.5 million for the Yongnam Thermal Power Plant at a one percent annual
interest rate. Considering Korea's economy in the 1960s, the $60 million loans given to
KEPCO's four projects was two to three percent of Korean GDP8 . This amount of foreign
investment was only possible because the Korean government guaranteed the loans; no
private investors at that time would have put such a big money into Korea's poor economy.
However, although foreign aid acted as the seed money for Korean electrification,
aid is no longer the advantage of state-owned KEPCO. Currently, Korea is supporting
other countries to build electricity infrastructure rather than obtaining aid from foreign
8 Korea's GDP was $2 billion in 1960 and $3 billion in 1965 (source: Bank of Korea website)
countries. Korea donated or aided at least twenty projects in Laos, Bangladesh, Nicaragua,
Jordan and others in 2010. In the same year, Korea gave a $25 million loan to Tanzania to
build 132 kV transmission lines and $49 million to Mozambique to extend transmission
and distribution lines with a 0.0 1% interest rate (MOFAT, 2010a).
Some might argue that Korea could rely on international aid on public projects other
than electricity infrastructure if Korea privatizes KEPCO. Actually, many developing
countries have privatized their public electric utilities to spend foreign aid on many other
purposes9 . In other words, if a country does not spend foreign aid on electricity, it can
spend the aid on other purposes such as education or hospitals. Furthermore, if a country
privatizes its public electric utility, international financial investors would become more
likely to invest in the country's electricity business.
Today, KEPCO obtains capital by issuing bonds in private markets rather than taking
foreign aid. Because KEPCO's credit level has always been one of the best in Korea,
borrowing money is not a major issue for KEPCO. This company's Moody's and S&P
credit ratings have been better than Al or A~ for most of the last twenty years (see [Exhibit
8). Based on its favorable credit, KEPCO has entered into numerous new businesses. For
example, it established KEPCO International Philippines (KEPCO-IP), which borrowed
$281 from a Japanese bank. KEPCO supported KEPCO-IP by guaranteeing the
implementation of the Philippine project. Another example is KEPCO Shanxi International,
which is investing in Chinese electric power generation. KEPCO guaranteed that it will
compensate Deutsche Bank's loss invested in the Chinese project if the project is not
9 Interview with MIT lecturer, Ignacio Perez-Arriaga, March 2011
successful. KEPCO guaranteed the repayment of $180 million loan, which is given to
KEPCO Shanxi International Ltd by HSBC and a Korean bank (KEPCO, 2010).
If KEPCO is privatized as one entity, its credibility and good reputation will
probably stay the same. However, if KEPCO were divided into several small companies,
its ability to attract large financial investments might decline. In other words, a $281
million or a $180 million loan guarantee is not a big problem for KEPCO, whose assets are
$83.52 billion. However, few financial institutes will invest in an energy venture company
that is not supported by a holding company like KEPCO.
In conclusion, there is little possibility that a privatized KEPCO would attract more
financial investment. The possibility might decrease if KEPCO is divided and sold as
several small companies. New investors would be interested in investing in the Korean
electricity market if they can make profit. However, because the government will still exert
a great deal of control over pricing, high profit is not necessarily assured.
4.4 Electricity price
Some studies, especially those that focus on the UK, argue that electric utility
privatization followed by competition decreases electricity prices (Boardman & Vining,
1989; Green, 1999; Newbery & Pollitt, 1997). They argue that state-owned electric utilities
monopolizing electricity markets are less efficient than competitive electricity suppliers. In
other words, their idea is that state-owned electric utilities produce more electricity than
the socially appropriate level (Q2 rather than QI in [Figure 12]). They also argue that
publicly-owned companies are managed less efficiently than private companies because
they do not need to compete in the market or they have more information about their
operation than regulators (MC2 rather than MCI in [Figure 12]).
[Figure 12] Prices and quantities of electricity service
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For example, electricity prices in England and Wales decreased after 1990 when the
UK privatized its state-owned electric utility: CEGB. David Newbery (1997) argues that
the price decrease is mainly due to "dash for gas," which privatized generation companies
shut down coal-power plants and invested in gas-power plants. He states that while 74
million tons of coal (92% of generation fuel) was burnt for generation in 1990, 30 million
tons of coal was used five years after the privatization. He adds that coal prices for
generation felt 20% in the same time.
Another reason for decrease in electricity price is cost reduction; privatized
companies operate more efficiently than publicly-owned electric utilities. While there is no
strong relationship between electricity privatization and electricity price decrease, private
electric companies are slightly more efficient than public firms. Michael Pollitt (1995)
found that private firms are 2% more efficient than public firms by comparing 768 power
stations in the world. In the US, investor-owned utilities are more cost-effective in
electricity generation while publicly-owned electricity companies are more efficient in
electricity distribution (Kwoka, 2005). As generation cost is around 60% of total electricity
price while distribution cost is less than 10% of total price, productive generations reduce
more cost than distributions.
Two issues are related to price decrease: costs are unevenly distributed to the general
public and benefits are concentrated on the new owners of the newly-privatized electric
companies. Although privatized companies are more efficient than publicly-owned
companies, the cost of efficiency is usually the layoffs of low-wage and less-skilled
workers. For example, the number of coal workers in the UK decreased from 25,000 in
1985 to 7,000 in 1994, when the "dash for gas" occurred in the 1990s (UK, Department of
Trade and Industry, 1995). This thesis does not investigate the effect of downsizing on
less-skilled workers because it is a political or social matter rather than an economic issue.
Another issue of privatization is that the benefits are concentrated on the new owners
of electric companies. In other words, the new owner can obtain more benefits from
reducing costs and maintaining the prices. As the newly-privatized companies' profits
increased after the privatization in the 1990s, the companies' share prices went up more
than 250% (Newbery & Pollitt, 1997). Although new investments in electricity generation
followed the sharp increase in the share prices, market price of electricity did not decline
rapidly. The profits might be allocated to shareholders rather than lowering electricity
prices.
The last issue is that large consumers benefit more from reduced prices than do small
consumers. As mentioned in Chapter 3.3, some privatized electric companies charge small
consumers more while charging large consumers less. Electricity retailers allocate cheaply-
purchased electricity to large consumers and expensively-purchased electricity to small
consumers, who are reluctant to change their suppliers because it takes time and
information. Retail prices for large consumers went down 22 percent from 1999 to 2002
while prices for small consumers went down a mere 5 percent (Thomas, 2005).
Some studies argue that state-owned electric utilities, which monopolize market,
offer cheaper electricity than privately owned energy suppliers, which compete against
other suppliers. As mentioned in Chapter 3.5, the prices in the traditional market are lower
than the deregulated market. Furthermore, the increasing rate of prices is lower in
traditional markets than de-regulated markets (see Exhibit [4-1] to [4-9]). Some researches
mention that government regulation on retail prices, rather than competition, prevented
prices from increasing. While large consumers have more incentives for changing their
electricity suppliers and many did so, little evidence support the idea that prices for large
consumers decreased after the deregulation in the US (Apt, 2005).
While electricity prices in a competitive market are not less expensive, they are more
volatile than in a non-privatized, traditional market. As electricity can not be stored, its
price must be decided by supply and demand every half hour or every hour. The problem is
that both supply (marginal cost) and demand are inelastic to price changes (Sweeney,
2008). This problem causes sharp price-change whenever demand changes across every
hour, day and season. Prices change when demands change and supplies change (see
[Figure 13]). As shown in the [Exhibit 10], electricity demand is high during the day while
low at night; high on weekdays while low on the weekend; high in summer and winter
while low in spring and fall. This means that electricity generation companies have to burn
expensive fuels such as gas and oil to meet peak demand on summer weekdays. On a
spring weekend night, however, generation companies can supply electricity at virtually no
cost because base-loads, such as coal and nuclear power plant, generate enough electricity
and their marginal cost is near zero.
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Considering the fact that fuel prices mostly affect generation prices, privatizing
KEPCO may not decrease the price significantly. KEPCO is offering one of the cheapest
electricity prices while purchasing one of the most expensive fuels in the world (see
[exhibit 11]). On the other hand, Korea's ratio of distribution losses to generation was the
smallest in the world recording 3.85%1o in 2008. These two data point that KEPCO is
efficiently running its generators and networks.
KECPO's activities, such as generation, transmission, distribution and retail services,
have different effects on prices because each activity has a different character. Regulators
can divide generation and retail services into several small units and introduce competition
among the small companies in each market. However, regulators can not divide
transmission and distribution because they are national and regional networks which
10 Divide distribution loss column by total generation column in [Exhibit 11]
connect all generators and consumers. All small countries allow only one entity to
monopolize transmission nationally and distribution regionally; large countries divide
transmission and distribution into regions and franchise monopoly in the regions. For
example, traditional utilities, such as NSTAR and National Grid, own and operate some
part of Boston area transmission and distribution lines. On the other hand, a non-profit
organization, Integrated System Operator - New England (ISO-NE) coordinates the
network in New England. In sum, the government can divide generation parts of KEPCO
into several small generation companies and introduce competition among the divided
companies while just privatizing transmission and distribution.
Korea has long been interested in privatizing generation because generation cost is
around 65% of total electricity prices (Kim, 2010). The Korean government separated the
generation parts form KEPCO and established six generation companies: five regional
generators and one nuclear/hydro power generating company. However, these companies
are not competing in the market but selling electricity with their marginal generation costs,
which are set by a government agency, KPX.
If KEPCO is privatized, the newly-privatized company will increase electricity
prices because current prices are lower than actual costs. According to the Korean
government, electricity price was 93.7% of the cost in 2010 after the government raised the
price, which was 91.5% of the cost in 2009 (MKE, 2010e). Because of political concerns,
such as protecting low-income citizens and considering economic downturn, the
government has suppressed electricity prices when the economy is in recession. KEPCO
balances its profits and losses in the long term rather than the short term. In other words,
KEPCO made a net profit for the five years of 2006 to 2010 while making not losses for
three years of 2008 to 2010 (see [Figure 14]). The government might raise the electricity
price to compensate KEPCO's three year loss if the world economy overcomes the current
recession. However, if KEPCO becomes privately owned, it will probably have to
frequently raise prices to make profit and pay dividends to shareholders. No shareholders
will wait several years until the newly-privatized company makes a profit.
[Figure 14] Annual sales and net profits of KEPCO
Unit: W billion
Year 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Annual sales 26,979.0 28,983.8 31,522.3 33,685.7 39,189.6
Net profit 2,070.5 1,556.8 -2,952.41 -77.7 -61.4
Source: http://dart.fss.or.kr/
4.5 Reduce government influence on economic development
Korea offered numerous favorable conditions to few industries. Discriminatory
electricity tariffs, low interest rates, cheap labor costs and tax breaks were the favorable
conditions. This legacy still remains in the electricity tariff in Korea. The Korean
government employed KEPCO as an important instrument of discriminatory electricity
pricing. The publicly owned electric utility has offered cheap and high-quality electricity to
nationally important industries, such as heavy and petro-chemical industries in the 1980s.
Today, Korea has different electricity-price tables for educational, street-lights and
agricultural services as well as residential, commercial and industrial services. Knowledge-
service industries, including nanotechnology labs, venture companies and integrated
telecommunication facilities, can use cheap electricity (KEPCO provision Article 59).
The government can offer favorable prices for nationally important electricity
demand both before and after privatizing KEPCO. The government can regulate the
privatized company to offer cheap electricity to any industries they want to support. The
government can also give tax credits for specific industries so that the newly-privatized
company will offer discounted prices for the industries. The only aspect the government
has to consider is whether the favorable conditions for specific industries increase social
welfare or not. While there are many debates whether a government should support
specific industry or not, the government can implement such policies no matter whether it
privatizes KEPCO.
Another concern about privatization is that the Korean government, which is popular
for its deep involvement in economic development, has to give up its policy tool: KEPCO.
The nuclear power industry in Korea is a good example of this. The Korean government
has long supported nuclear power industries with KEPCO by building numerous nuclear
plants, supporting research and development, encouraging exports and developing
regulations.
Korea's nuclear power industry has evolved from import to import-substitution and
to export orientation. Its nuclear power plant history has four eras (see [Exhibit 4]). The
first era, from the late 1960s to the late 1970s, is when KEPCO merely bought foreign
nuclear plants without any knowledge about the industry. The second era, from the late
1970s to the mid 1980s, is when KEPCO understood the whole picture and tried to develop
domestic technologies. The third era, the 1990s, is when Korea developed 95% of domestic
technologies. The fourth era, after the 2000s, is when Korea developed its own nuclear
power plants (MKE, 2011 b).
The three first-era power plants were built by foreign technologies in the 1970 and
the early 1980s. As Korea did not have any knowledge about nuclear power plants, it
depended on foreign countries for designing, purchasing materials, constructing, test-
running and follow-up services. Korean companies, such as Hyundai and Donga, did the
simplest jobs such as constructing building sites, and supplying law materials and labor
under the supervision of foreign companies. KEPCO financially supported the construction
with foreign aid, which is guaranteed by the Korean government (MKE, 2011 b).
The second era is when KEPCO tried to develop domestic technologies. After
vaguely understanding nuclear power plant construction, KEPCO changed its contract
from turnkey to non-turnkey in the mid 1980s. Non-turnkey contracting is separately
contracting each part of construction under KEPCO's supervision. By dividing nuclear
power plant construction into numerous steps, KEPCO could find which parts could be
domestically produced and which technology should be developed (Amsden, 1989). Six
power plants-- Kori #3, Kori #4, Youngkwang #1, Youngkwang #2, Wlojin #1, and Woljin
#2-- were built under the non-turnkey scheme in the 1980s. Korean companies took part in
all the steps, including designing the plants, supplying machines and constructing the
plants. Korean companies accumulated knowledge about building construction, while
understanding five percent of designing know-how and forty percent of machine-related
technologies (MKE, 201 1b).
The third era is when KEPCO and domestic companies developed enough
technologies and accumulated plenty of experiences. After Korea obtained experiences and
technologies, KEPCO contracted mainly with Korean companies and mandated the
companies to build power plants with their own technologies with few exceptions. Foreign
companies had to sub-contract with the Korean companies, not with KEPCO anymore.
Youngkwang #3, which was completed in 1994, and Youngkwang #4, completed in 1996,
are examples of the new trend.
Wolsung #2, Wolsung #3, and Wolsung #4, which were completed from 1997 to
1999, are other examples of domestic technology developments. KEPCO contracted with a
Canadian company, AECL, for designing and equipment supplies. At the same time,
KEPCO made a technology transfer contract with the Canadian company to obtain heavy-
water reactor technology (MKE, 201 lb).
The fourth era is when Korea developed its authentic technologies. KEPCO has been
constructing the Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plants (OPR1000) since the mid 1990s.
KEPCO developed OPR1OOO design and applied this design on six projects: Woijin #1,
Woijin #2, Woljin #3, Woljin #4, Youngkwang #5, and Youngkwang #6. KEPCO is also
constructing four other OPR1000 power plants: Sin-gori #1, Sin-gori #2, Sin-wolsung #1,
and Sin-wolsung #2. There is no doubt that Korean nuclear companies and KEPCO
accumulated knowledge by continuously constructing nuclear plants. Currently, KEPCO is
building Advanced Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plants (APR1400), including Sin-gori
#3 and Sin-gori #4. KEPCO consortium signed a contract with United Arab Emirates to
build four APR1400 nuclear power plants and to supply all related services, such as
maintenance and nuclear fuel, for a cost of $40 billion in 2009 (MKE, 2009).
Government-lead research and development made the import substitution possible.
In 1983, the government developed a master plan to localize most of the nuclear power
plant technologies and to develop OPR1000. The plan set a goal of "developing 95%
domestic technology," and distributed assignments to public and private companies. Under
the plan, KEPCO had to develop general project management; KEPCO E&C was in charge
of plant design; Doosan Heavy was in charge of machines; and construction companies
were in charge of building construction. As a result of the plan, Korea's domestic
technologies for nuclear power plant increased from 60% in 1986 to 95% in 1995. After
developing OPR1000, KEPCO developed a more advanced nuclear power plant model,
APR1400, from 1992 to 2002. Based on the OPR1OOO technology and the experiences of
building ten OPR1000, the new model reflects Korea's numerous experiences and self-
developed technologies. According to the Korean government, its nuclear power plants are
some of the safest, least expensive and quickest to build (MKE, 2009).
If KEPCO were a private company, the nuclear industry could not have grown so
fast in Korea. Private electric utilities merely buy the cheapest power plants, no matter
which type it is. In other words, all nuclear power related companies and technicians would
have to rely on the newly-privatized electric utility, which does not care about them. In this
case, the nuclear power companies and technicians have no choice but to export their
products and services to foreign countries. However, Korea's nuclear industry is not as
competitive as foreign ones yet. Furthermore, KEPCO's nuclear power business might be
vulnerable to international business cycles as they do not have any steady demands.
The US and French nuclear power industries are good examples of different electric
utility ownerships which affect different nuclear power plant installation. The French
nuclear industry is more developed than that of the US because the French government has
more influence on the industry than the US government.
The US utilities did not build any nuclear power plant after the Three-Mile Island
accident in Pennsylvania in 1979, although they built 104 nuclear plants in the 1960s and
the 1970s (Delmas & Heiman, 2001). Private companies have avoided investing in nuclear
powers because of the enormous construction cost and long construction period that is
frequently prolonged by public opposition. The capital costs increase dramatically when
the construction periods are extended, so that electricity from nuclear plants gets more
expensive relative to that from other sources such as coal. Ordinarily, the production cost
from a nuclear plant is 21.16 $/MW, while that of a coal plant is 35.69$/MW in 2008 (US,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 2010). The private companies' negative attitudes toward
nuclear power plants are different from the government's attitude. For example, President
George W. Bush said "America should also expand a clean and unlimited source of energy,
nuclear power" when he announced his energy plan in 2001. Vice President Dick Cheney
added that "the government has not granted a single new nuclear power permit in more
than 20 years. But there is a reason for that; no utility company has submitted an
application for a nuclear power permit in more than 20 years (The New York Times,
2001)." In sum, the government has not effectively managed private companies to follow
its guidance.
On the other hand, the French government is popular for nuclear power promotion
policy with its state owned utility, Electricit6 de France (EDF), and publicly owned multi-
national nuclear power conglomerate, Areva. The French government has promoted
nuclear power industry since the early 1960s because it believed nuclear power enhances
France's energy independence from foreign states. The French nuclear industry is
distinguished by few players and strong government leadership. In 1955, the French
government banded several government organizations to promote nuclear power industry:
EDF, Commissariat al 'Energie Atomique (CEA), Cogema and Framatome. EDF
controlled all electricity services including generation, transmission and retail services.
CEA administered researches, and controlled all nuclear activities such as developing
nuclear power applications. The French government also owned both Cogema, which had a
monopoly on nuclear-fuel processing, and Framatome, which produced nuclear reactors. In
2001, the French government established a government-owned nuclear conglomerate
Areva by merging CEA, Cogema and Framatome (Fagnani & Moatti, 2004). Currently,
Areva supplies all nuclear power services including "uranium exploration, mining and
concentration; uranium conversion and enrichment; nuclear fuel design and fabrication;
design and construction of nuclear reactors; supply of products and services for nuclear
power plant maintenance, upgrades and operations; treatment and recycling of used nuclear
fuel; and cleanup of nuclear facilities" (Areva, 2009).
It is too hasty to conclude that Korea should keep the ownership of KEPCO to raise
the company's competitiveness with the US and French examples. However, it is true that
KEPCO has grown up to an international electricity conglomerate with the support of the
government. It is also true that KEPCO is still too small to compete against multi-national
companies such as Areva, which is owned by the French government.
4.6. Transition cost
Even though the benefit from the privatization is bigger than the cost, the
government has to consider the transition cost. Although perfect competition can finally be
achieved by privatization, developing such a condition is not always quick and easy.
Imperfect competition can dominate the electricity market if a few companies
explicitly or implicitly collude while the government does not know the situation. The
2000/2001 Western Energy Crisis is a good example of wholesale market manipulation by
few generation companies. In 1998, California introduced a competitive wholesale
electricity market according to the California Assembly Bill 1890. Electricity prices were
stable right after the de-regulation until the spring of 2000 (Weare, 2003). However, prices
increased rapidly after April 2000 and remained extremely high until July 2001 (see
[Figure 15]). California electricity consumers spent $40 billion in debt cost because the
wholesale prices were three times more expensive in 2000 and 2001 than 1999; the
electricity price per year was $27 billion dollars in 2000 and 2001 while that was $7.4
billion in 1999 (Weare, 2003). The high wholesale electricity prices provoked severe
problems to customers and electric utilities: San Diego Gas & Electric (SDG&E), Pacific
Gas & Electric (PG&E) and Southern California Edison (SCE). SDG&E customers had to
pay two or three times more expensive prices because their electricity prices were based on
wholesale prices. On the other hand, PG&E and SCE customers were protected from the
soaring wholesale prices because their electricity bills were fixed by the government.
PG&E and SCE had to offer electricity with pre-determined prices while being
compensated for their previous investment in generations; SDG&E had to offer electricity
based on wholesale market price because its compensation period ended in July 1999. The
utilities sold electricity at a price of $65 per megawatts-hour ($65/MWh) to their customers
when the wholesale prices were ranging from $150/MWh to $1000/MWh (Sweeney, 2008).
As PG&E and SCE had to buy expensive electricity in the wholesale market and sell cheap
electricity in the retail market, their financial statuses were dangerous; PG&E went
bankrupt in April 2001 and SCE was almost bankrupt until renegotiating a new tariff with
the regulator (Weare, 2003).
[Figure 15] California electricity wholesale [Figure 16] Scheduled generation offline
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Uncertainty about deregulation, incomplete market design and market manipulation
are the main reasons of the energy crisis. The uncertainty about transitioning from a
regional monopoly to a competitive wholesale market led to insufficient investment in
power generation. While electricity demand grew 1.5% in the 1990s and 4% between 1998
and 2000, generation capacity did not grow at all in the same time. Investors had less
interest in power plants when electricity prices were cheap before the energy crisis; they
increased the investment when they saw high electricity prices (Sweeney, 2008).
Incomplete market design, which regulated utilities to buy all electricity in the spot-
wholesale market, was proved problematic when wholesale prices were extremely high.
Both utilities and final customers such as households and factories suffered from the 100%
spot-wholesale market regulation. If utilities raise retail prices when wholesale prices
increase, final customers paid more electricity charges. If utilities do not raise retail prices
when wholesale prices increase, they confront severe financial problems.
Market manipulation by significant generators is one of the most debated reasons of
the crisis. The General Accounting Office (GAO) proved that the wholesale electricity
market in California from August to October 2000 was manipulated (GAO, 2001). While
1998 prices were high in the afternoon when the demands were high, the 2000 prices were
higher in the morning than in the afternoon. Other research raised the possibility that
generation companies intentionally shut down power plants (Weare, 2003). This research
found that 2000 and 2001 scheduled generation off-line was enormously higher than 1999
(see [Figure 16]).
Many studies argue that the British and Wales electricity wholesale market was also
manipulated. While marginal costs are equal to market prices in competitive markets, the
British and Welsh market prices were higher than marginal costs (Wolfram, 1998; Green,
1999). However, Catherine D. Wolfram found that the market prices were slightly higher
than the marginal cost. This means that market manipulation was not implemented
thoroughly because of threat of government intervention, possibility of new entrants and
"contract for differences (CfD)" (Wolfram, 1998). Under CfD, electricity buyers and
sellers compensate other parties when market prices are higher or lower than their contracts.
For example, generators financially compensate for their consumers' loss if market prices
are higher than the contract prices. As the two major British and Welch power generators,
PowerGen and National Power, sell more than 80% of their electricity by CfD, they have
little incentive to manipulate market prices (Green, 1999).
Deficient transmission lines and poor coordination are also problems of the transition
from regional monopoly to competition in a wide area. The traditional electricity monopoly
does not need as many transmission lines as the de-regulated market. Traditional electricity
suppliers provide electricity to customers residing in their territory such as a part of Boston;
competitive suppliers supply electricity to any customers within a region, such as New
England.
The blackout in north-eastern America is a good example of insufficient
transmission networks and poor coordination among utilities and states. The blackouts
started around 4 pm on August 14, 2003, and affected more than 50 million people in
north-eastern American, in Ontario, Toronto, Cleveland, New York City, Buffalo, Albany,
Long Island, Detroit, New Jersey, Vermont and Connecticut (U.S.-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force, 2004).
The large area blackout started from First Energy Corporation (FE), which supplied
electricity to Cleveland and Akron, Ohio. As the company's alarm system failed two hours
before the blackout, FE could not know of any crucial problems with its transmission line
with its own alert system. From 15:05:41 to 15:41:35 EDT, FE's three 345kV transmission
lines heading to Cleveland and Akron failed because of contacts between sagged power
lines and over-grown trees. Transmission lines severely sag when weather is hot and load
is high. The failure of the three 345kV lines increased the load on the neighboring 125kV
lines and caused voltages decrease. The neighboring 16 lines failed because of the
increased load from 15:39 to 16:08 EDT. The trips of the 19 transmission lines caused
blackout not only in the northern Ohio cities but also the whole of north-east America.
Because of the high load and low voltage caused by the tripped line, regions including
New York, Pennsylvania, New Jersey and Maryland disconnected from the other regions.
Populated regions such as New York and Pennsylvania experienced blackouts when this
happened because they could not import electricity from other states through the inter-state
transmission lines (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004).
The institutional reason for the blackout is that Midwest Integrated System Operator
(Midwest ISO)" did not have enough authority because it was in a developmental stage. If
the Midwest ISO had enough authority, it could have prevented such a large-scale blackout.
However, the 23 electric utilities that joined Midwest-ISO still controlled their own
generation and transmission. Other ISOs centrally coordinate power generation and
transmission of a wide area. For example, Integrated System Operator New England (ISO-
NE) has the authority to control all the generation and transmission in the New England
region (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004).
The economic reason for the blackout is that restructuring in Ohio caused
insufficient transmission upgrades. Since the generation market was under competition,
investment in power plants was more profitable than transmission, whose return rates are
set by the regulator. Furthermore, former utilities were reluctant to invest in transmission
because the "ceiling" on the transmission part of their retail rates. This ceiling could
prevent new investments by causing liquidity constraints on the utility owners (Rosen,
2003).
The technical reason is that reactive power12 was not sufficiently generated and
stored in FE. Although reactive power is crucial to stable electricity operation, no one
compensated the cost. Independent generators, who sell electricity not in their territory but
in the market, did not have any incentive to generate reactive power under the
remuneration system (U.S.-Canada Power System Outage Task Force, 2004).
" It covers 13 US states such as Illinois, Ohio, Michigan, Kentucky, Missouri, Indiana,
Virginia, Wisconsin, Iowa, and Minnesota
12 Reactive power is defined as "the energy supplied to create or be stored in electric or
magnetic fields in and around electrical equipment" by the U.S.-Canada Power System
Outage Task Force (2003)
The US government struggled with the problem of market manipulation and
insufficient coordination. When the Korean government privatizes KEPCO, it has to
consider the possibility of market manipulation rather than insufficient coordination. As
South Korea's transmission system is developed as one unit, the policy maker does not
need to worry about connecting its transmission lines to create a big market. In other words,
Korean transmission lines are already interconnected with each other. Since its
establishment in 1961, KEPCO has networked the whole Korean mainland and its
numerous islands, including Jeju Island, which is approximately 140km from the mainland.
Today, KEPCO can remotely monitor and control all 715 substations in the country
(KEPCO, 2010).
The possibility of market manipulation by significant privatized generation
companies is bigger than the possibility of ill coordination of transmission lines in Korea.
As this thesis argues in section 4.2, only several companies have enough scale to merge
KEPCO's generation subsidiaries. If few companies supply generation services, they can
implicitly and explicitly collude in a cartel. As shown in the 2000/2001 Eastern Energy
Crisis, generators tend to collude to reduce production and raise electricity price to earn
monopolistic profits.
5. CONCLUSION
This thesis investigates whether South Korea should privatize KEPCO. The first
chapter discusses the current situation and the meaning of privatizing KEPCO. As shown
in the first chapter, merely selling government's shares to private parties is not enough.
The regulator has to develop a whole system of rules to guarantee market competition
among the newly-privatized KEPCO and new comers in the market.
The second chapter discusses Chile, the United Kingdom and the United States.
Each country has a different background for privatization and experience with privatization.
While electricity prices declined in the UK, many researchers argue that a lot of problems
are related to the decline. On the other hand, some researchers argue that the Chilean
electricity market price skyrocketed as a result of the privatization.
Chapter 3 focuses on the benefits and costs of KEPCO privatization. First, the
Korean government can earn up to W9.4 trillion by selling all of its shares of KEPCO. On
the other hand, the government has to give up its control over the w93 trillion company
which owns 88% of generation capacity, all transmission and distribution networks, and 29
subsidiaries worth w30 trillion.
The first part of the third chapter also discusses the challenge of finding new owners
for KEPCO. Only eight chaebols have the financial ability to buy KEPCO. Selling KEPCO
to the general public could prevent chaebols from dominating the electricity market.
History, however, shows that selling KEPCO shares to low-income citizens does not
always benefit them.
Chapter 3.3 deals with the possibility of obtaining loans and financial investment in
the electricity industry. This thesis shows that foreign aid is not the right answer for South
Korea today, although foreign aid set the foundation of the country's electrification. Today,
KEPCO obtains capital by issuing bonds in financial market. This thesis argues that
investors are lending their money to KEPCO because KEPCO has shown stable operations
and paid reasonable interest. This paper also argues that few investors will invest in the
Korean electricity market if KEPCO is divided into small companies and sold separately.
Chapter 3.4 discusses whether electricity prices will go down after the privatization.
The electricity prices of the UK, which privatized its state-owned electric utility in the
1990s, declined after the privatization. However, there are numerous critics of the price
decline. First, the price decline is only beneficial to large consumers; electricity prices for
large consumers went down 22 percent from 1990 to 2000, while those for small
consumers went down merely 5 percent in the same period (Thomas, 2009). This thesis
finds that privatized KEPCO would frequently raise electricity prices, which are currently
lower than the costs. No shareholder would wait several years until the newly-privatized
company makes a profit.
Chapter 3.5 investigates the ramifications of electricity privatization on the
relationship between the government and market. This thesis argues that the government
can offer discriminative electricity tariffs for specific industries after the privatization. This
thesis also mentions, however, that the government influence on its electricity and related
industries will decrease after the privatization of KEPCO. This paper proves the argument
by showing that the government developed the nuclear power industry with KEPCO.
The last part of chapter 3 discusses transition costs from a monopoly by a state-
owned utility to competition among private companies. This thesis argues that decision-
makers should prepare more for market manipulation than for coordination. As Korea is
comparatively small and has an integrated network, it does not need to worry about a
coordination problem. On the other hand, the country has to develop specific regulation to
prevent market manipulation by a few new owners of KEPCO.
This thesis will be useful to researchers who want to approach the benefits and costs
of KEPCO privatization from the point of academics. However, decision makers should
also consider many aspects of privatization which are not discussed in this paper. For
example, political and social considerations are important to painlessly implement the
privatization. The government can obtain citizen supports by understanding which groups
will be better off and informing the benefits to the group. The government could develop
compensation policies for the people who are worse off, obtaining their support.
[Exhibit 1] KEPCO Subsidiaries
Affiliate Owner Book Value Business
ship(% (Million Won)
Korea Gas Corporation 24.5 1,330,534 Monopoly in importing LNG,
distributes it to retailers
KEPCO KPS 80.0 342,606 Power plant maintenance and
removal
LG Powercomm 38.8 326,096 Telecommunication
KEPCO Engineering & 77.9 54,837 Power plant construction
Construction
Korea Hydro & Nuclear Power 100.0 13,945,112 Nuclear and Hydro power plant
operation
Korea South-East Power Co. 100.0 2,185,930 Power plant operation
Korea Midland Power Co., Ltd. 100.0 2,497,639 Power plant operation
Korea Western Power Co., Ltd. 100.0 2,355,088 Power plant operation
Korea Southern Power Co., Ltd. 100.0 2,513,091 Power plant operation
Korea East-West Power Co., Ltd. 100.0 2,564,954 Power plant operation
KEPCO Nuclear Fuel Co., Ltd. 96.4 191,866 Nuclear Fuel
Korea Electric Power Industrial 49.0 26,553 Reading and recording electricity
Development, Ltd. meters on a regular basis
Korea Electric Power Data 100.0 205,513 IT services related to electric
Network Co., Ltd. power
Korea District Heating Co. 26.1 226,619 Supply massive-scale heating
with heat obtained from
generation
KEPCO International Hong Kong 100.0 398,503
Ltd.
KEPCO International Philippines 100.0 229,694 Generation (Coal-Power plant,
Gas-power plant, Oil fired Plant)
KEPCO Gansu International Ltd. 100.0 18,746 Generation (Wind)
KEPCO Philippines Holdings Inc 100.0 55,582 Generation
KEPCO Asia International Ltd. 58.0 3
KEPCO Lebanon SARL 51.0 738 Generation
KEPCO Neimenggu International 100.0 112,038 Generation (China, Wind)
KEPCO Shanxi International Ltd. 100.0 321,156 Generation ( China, Wind)
KEPCO Australia Pty Ltd. 100.0 22,331 Coal production
KEPCO Canada Energy Inc. 100.0 54,456 Uranium exploration &
production
KEPCO Netherlands B.V. 100.0 180,609
KEPCO Energy Resource Nigeria 30.0 7,271 Oil exploration
KNOC Nigerian East Oil Co. 14.6 12 Oil exploration
KNOC Nigerian West Oil Co. 14.6 12 Oil exploration




[Exhibit 2] Net generation by sector in the US in 2008
Independent B/ Independent B/Utility Power (A+B) utility Power (A+B)(A) Producers % (A) Producers %
(B) (B)
New Jersey -46 31,837 100% Iowa 22,481 4,841 18%
Maine 0 5,603 100% Oklahoma 27,575 5,920 18%
D.C. 0 101 100% Me 13,808 2,810 17%
Maryland 3 20,827 100% Michigan 44,942 8,827 16%
Rhode Island 4 3,558 100% Arkansas 23,815 4,417 16%
Connecticut 27 14,637 100% Arizona 42,528 7,467 15%
Pennsylvania 681 106,871 99% Virginia 30,158 5,118 15%
Massachusetts 304 20,068 99% Washingto 42,302 7,064 14%
n
Illinois 2,607 93,242 97% Alabama 63,891 9,766 13%
Delaware NM 2,661 95% Minnesota 23,052 3,300 13%
Vermont 418 2,739 87% Indiana 51,157 6,705 12%
New 2,128 8,097 79% 3,638 351 9%Hampshire Dakota
Montana 3,005 11,194 79% Dota 15,355 1,463 9%
Texas 44,509 131,993 75% Florida 98,195 8,049 8%
New York 17,077 46,969 73% Georgia 59,082 4,771 7%
California 42,477 44,155 51% Kentucky 44,905 2,997 6%
Mississippi 14,574 9,373 39% Kansas 22,572 1,307 5%
Hawaii 3,024 1,800 37% Wyoming 21,174 1,068 5%
Nevada 11,015 5,958 35% North 59,495 2,546 4%
_____________ Carolina 5945 246 4
Ohio 46,167 21,933 32% Utah 20,300 650 3%
Louisiana 23,214 11,007 32% Alaska 3,083 79 2%
West Virginia 29,807 12,364 29% Missouri 43,686 751 2%
Wisconsin 22,830 7,883 26% Caolina 49,851 640 1%
Idaho 3,986 1,195 23% Nebraska 17,362 108 1%
Colorado 18,667 5,555 23% Tennessee 39,622 126 0%
Oregon 20,840 5,923 22% Total ',91,34 38%
Source: author, data from EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table1_6_a.html)
[Exhibit 3] 2010 retail price by state, by de-regulation in the US (cents/kilowatt-hour)
Ran Stte(C/k%) rak sa (( 4) r~ tl Ckb
1 Hawaii 25.33 18 Michigan 10.42 35 South Carolina 8.58
2 Connecticut 17.33 19 Nevada 10.23 36 South Dakota 8.14
3 New York 17.15 20 Colorado 9.98 37 Nebraska 8.11
4 New Jersey 15.65 21 Wisconsin 9.97 38 Oklahoma 8.07
5 Alaska 15.39 22 Texas 9.77 39 Arkansas 7.84
6 New Hampshire 14.63 23 Illinois 9.58 40 Iowa 7.81
7 Rhode Island 14.56 24 Georgia 9.41 41 North Dakota 7.7
8 Massachusetts 14.46 25 Ohio 9.35 42 Oregon 7.69
9 California 14.41 26 Alabama 9.17 43 Louisiana 7.62
District of
10 Columbia 13.89 27 New Mexico 8.96 44 Utah 7.58
11 Vermont 13.17 28 Missouri 8.86 45 Montana 7.47
12 Maryland 13.12 29 Mississippi 8.83 46 Indiana 7.47
13 Delaware 12.34 30 Tennessee 8.81 47 West Virginia 7.14
14 Maine 12.29 31 Virginia 8.78 48 Kentucky 6.87
15 Florida 10.72 32 Minnesota 8.68 49 Idaho 6.69
16 Arizona 10.52 33 North Carolina 8.63 50 Washington 6.52
17 Pennsylvania 10.48 34 Kansas 8.62 51 Wyoming 6.12
Source: retail price: EIA (http://www.eia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/epm/table5_3.html)
Restructuring: EIA (http://wwweia.doe.gov/cneaf/electricity/page/restructuring/restricture-elect.html)
[Exhibit 4-1] comparison of average retail prices in the US (October, 2010)
16 states 35 other states
Average Retail Price Residential (c/kWh) 12.18 10.51
Average Retail Price Commercial (c/kWh) 10.72 9.24
Average Retail Price Industrial (c/kWh) 8.6 6.95
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[Exhibit 4-4] Electricity price increase rate in the US (%, residential sector)
90-*00 11.9% 4.8%
00- 10 40.0% 22.1%
90- 10 56.6% 28.0%
[Exhibit 4-5] Electricity price increase rate in the US (%, commercial sector)




[Exhibit 4-6] Electricity price increase rate in the US (%, industrial sector)
iudustial( 6 states indu'.strial(others)-
90- 00 0.9% -2.4%
00-10 62.9% 37.8%
90->10 64.3% 34.6%





1990 8.68 7.79 89.7% 6.9 6.24 90.4%
1996 10.11 8.6 85.1% 7.12 6.33 88.9%
2001 9.94 8.75 88.0% 7.43 6.4 86.1%
2006 12.22 11.06 90.5% 8.57 7.41 86.5%
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[Exhibit 4-9] Residential, industrial and relative industrial price in the US (cents/kWh, %)
Year 16 states Other states
Residential Industrial Relative Residential Industrial Relative
(A) (B) industrial price* (A) (B) industrial
pnice*
1990 8.68 5.86 67.5% 6.9 4.25 61.6%
1996 10.11 5.93 58.7% 7.12 4.15 58.3%
2001 9.94 5.91 59.5% 7.43 4.15 55.9%
2006 12.22 9.09 74.4% 8.57 5.21 60.8%
2010 13.59 9.63 70.9% 8.83 5.72 64.8%
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[Exhibit 5] The 30 biggest Korean companies (stock market value)
Unit: W 100 million




















































































Source: Korea Stock Exchange
[Exhibit 6] Korean GDP and generation capacity
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[Exhibit 7] The world electricity generation
change change
1995 2000 change
over over 2005 over
Terawatt-hours 1990 1995 1990 2000 1995 2005 2000
US 3185.4 3516.8 10.4% 3990.5 13.5% 4257.4 6.7%
Canada 482.0 559.6 16.1% 604.8 8.1% 597.2 -1.2%
Argentina 50.9 67.2 31.9% 89.0 32.5% 105.5 18.6%
Brazil 222.8 275.6 23.7% 348.9 26.6% 402.9 15.5%
Chile 18.4 26.7 45.6% 40.1 49.9% 54.5 35.9%
Austria 50.4 56.6 12.2% 61.8 9.2% 60.6 -1.9%
Czech Republic 62.6 60.8 -2.7% 73.5 20.7% 82.6 12.4%
Denmark 25.8 36.6 42.1% 35.8 -2.1% 36.0 0.5%
Finland 54.0 63.2 17.0% 70.0 10.7% 70.3 0.4%
France 420.2 493.9 17.6% 540.8 9.5% 576.2 6.5%
Germany 549.9 534.7 -2.8% 564.5 5.6% 620.3 9.9%
Greece 35.0 41.6 18.7% 53.8 29.6% 60.0 11.5%
Hungary 28.4 34.0 19.7% 35.2 3.5% 35.8 1.6%
Iceland 4.5 5.0 10.3% 7.7 54.3% 8.7 13.0%
Republic of Ireland 14.5 17.9 23.2% 24.0 34.1% 26.0 8.3%
Italy 216.9 241.5 11.3% 276.6 14.6% 303.7 9.8%
Poland 136.4 139.0 1.9% 145.2 4.4% 156.9 8.1%
Portugal 28.5 33.3 16.7% 43.8 31.6% 46.6 6.4%
Romania 63.8 59.3 -7.1% 51.9 -12.4% 59.4 14.4%
Russian Federation 1082.2 862.1 -20.3% 877.8 1.8% 953.1 8.6%
Slovakia 24.0 25.9 7.9% 30.7 18.5% 31.5 2.5%
Spain 151.7 168.9 11.3% 224.8 33.1% 294.1 30.8%
Sweden 146.5 147.6 0.8% 145.8 -1.3% 158.4 8.7%
Switzerland 55.8 63.1 13.0% 67.4 6.8% 59.8 -11.3%
Turkey 57.5 86.2 49.9% 124.9 44.8% 162.0 29.7%
Turkmenistan 14.6 9.8 -32.9% 9.8 0.5% 12.8 30.2%
Ukraine 298.5 194.0 -35.0% 169.0 -12.9% 185.0 9.5%
United Kingdom 319.7 337.4 5.5% 377.1 11.7% 398.4 5.6%
Uzbekistan 56.3 47.4 -15.8% 46.8 -1.3% 47.7 1.9%
Iran 57.7 84.4 46.3% 119.3 41.5% 169.7 42.2%
Kuwait 18.5 23.7 28.4% 32.9 38.5% 43.7 33.1%
Qatar 4.8 6.0 24.2% 9.1 51.9% 14.4 57.6%
Saudi Arabia 70.1 99.9 42.4% 126.2 26.4% 175.0 38.7%
South Africa 165.4 188.1 13.8% 210.7 12.0% 244.9 16.3%
Bangladesh 8.3 12.1 45.5% 15.8 30.1% 22.6 43.7%
China 621.2 1006.6 62.0% 1355.6 34.7% 2500.3 84.4%
China Hong Kong SAR 29.0 27.9 -3.6% 31.3 12.2% 38.4 22.7%
India 296.0 422.7 42.8% 565.4 33.8% 708.7 25.3%
Indonesia 33.3 58.9 76.6% 92.6 57.3% 127.4 37.5%
Japan 841.1 968.6 15.2% 1057.9 9.2% 1133.6 7.2%
Malaysia 25.3 46.6 84.6% 66.7 43.0% 96.2 44.3%
New Zealand 32.1 36.0 12.0% 39.3 9.1% 43.0 9.4%
Pakistan 46.0 63.8 38.6% 64.7 1.4% 87.1 34.7%
Philippines 26.3 33.6 27.5% 45.3 35.0% 56.6 24.9%
Singapore 15.6 22.1 41.2% 31.7 43.6% 38.2 20.7%
South Korea 118.7 205.1 72.7% 295.2 43.9% 396.6 34.4%
Taiwan 90.2 133.1 47.6% 184.9 38.9% 227.4 23.0%
Thailand 46.2 83.7 81.2% 96.0 14.7% 132.2 37.7%
otal World 11865.4 13272.9 1.9% 15401.2 16.0% 18301.8 18.8%
OECD 7586.0 8481.2 11.8% 9625.1 13.5% 10427.1 8.3%
Source: EIA website (www.eia.doe.gov)
































[Exhibit 9] Nuclear Power plants in Korea
Era Name Begin Construction Begin Operation
1" Era Kori #1 1970 1978
100% Foreign technologies
Foreign drive - Turnkey Contract Wolsung#1 1976 1983
Kori#2 1977 1983
2nd Era Kori#3 1978 1985
Developing Domestic Technology
KEPCO drive Kori#4 1978 1986
Non-turnkey contract __ __ __ __ __ __ 1980 _1986
Youngkwang#1 1980 1986
Youngkwang#2 1980 1987
Woljin #1 1981 1988
Woljin #2 1981 1989






4' Era Woljin #3 1992 1998
Korea Standard Nuclear Power Plants
(OPR 1000) Woljin#4 1992 1999
Advanced Korea Standard Nuclear Woljin#5 1999 2004




Sin-Gori #1 2005 2011
Sin-Gori #2 2005 2011
Sin-Wolsung#l 2005 2012
Sin-Wolsung#2 2005 2013
Sin-Gori #3 2007 2013
Sin-Gori #4 2007 2014
Sin-Wojin #1 2016
Sin-Woljin#2 2017
Source: MKE, 201 lb
[Exhibit 10] Electricity demand
Hourly Electricity Demand in Massachusetts in March 29, 2011
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Data: ISO-NE (http://www.iso-ne.com/markets/hrly-data/selectHourlyLoad.do#anchor2)
Weekly Electricity Demand in Massachusetts from March 20 to 26 (Sun. to Sat), 2011
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[Exhibit 11] World electricity statistics
2008 2008 2008
2008 2008 Total 2008 2008 Heavy Fuel Natural Gas Electricit
Total Electricity Retail Price Steam Coal Oil Prices Prices for y
Country Electricity Generation for Price for for Electricity Distributi
Generation Capacity Household electricity Electricity Generation on
(TWh) (GW) ($/kWh) generation Generation ($/Million Losses($/Sq. Ton) ($/Sq. Ton) Kilocalories (Billion
kWh)
Argentina 0.023 NA NA NA
115.41894 30.96539 (2007) 16.175
Australia 0.098 NA NA NA
242.2236 55.511 (2004) 16.848
Austria 61.9222 20.797 0.201 122.10 342.3 NA 3.449
Barbados 1.011 0.2391 NA NA NA NA 0.066
Belgium 160.4
78.4413 16.76 NA 130.54 (2002) NA 4.262
Bolivia 5.9817 1.45401 NA NA NA NA 0.804
Brazil 454.82956 103.9606 0.171 NA NA NA 77.081
Canada 0.078 26.29 222.4 218.7
632.227 127.644 (2006) (2006) (2006) (2006) 50.518
Chile 60.281 13.145 0.195 NA NA NA 5.081
china 3221.1811 797.078 NA NA NA NA 191.829
Colombia 51.01477 13.3955 0.135 NA NA NA 10.798
Costa Rica 9.2895 2.36966 0.097 NA NA NA 0.973
Croatia 0.107 NA NA NA
11.6579 3.908 (2007) 1.706
Cuba 16.9904 5.3962 NA NA NA NA 2.787
Cyprus NA NA 304.6 NA
4.7092 1.119 (2006) 0.153
Czech NA 197.7959
Republic 78.4343 17.739 0.191 438.4 (2003) 4.662
Denmark 34.3174 12.495 0.396 NA NA C 2.358
Dominican 14.5765 5.5182 0.136 NA NA NA 1.711
Ecuador 18.0611 4.189 0.094 NA NA NA 3.774
El Salvador 5.7208 1.5259 NA NA NA NA 0.107
Finland 73.6479 16.648 0.172 142.90 577 340.1 3.334
France 541.8663 117.822 0.169 136.10 NA NA 32.916
0.263
Germany 594.6854 139.276 (2007) 152.60 572.1 NA 30.118
Greece 0.112 NA NA58.9681 14.253 (2005) C 5.053
Guatemala 8.3954 2.29 NA NA NA NA 1.216
Guyana 0.466 0.309 NA NA NA NA 0.132
Haiti 0.244 NA NA NA NA 0.257
Honduras 6.2611 1.593 NA NA NA NA 1.346
Hungary 37.8052 8.63 0.224 NA NA 623.7 3.888
India 0.047 24.25 NA785.52885 177.37552 (2005) 665.3 193.741
Indonesia 0.061 NA 449.6 66.54
141.1852 27.8016 (2006) (2006) 15.038
Ireland 27.4745 7.402 0.267 99.46 566.1 C 2.248
Israel 0.098 NA NA53.0385 11.69 (2006) NA 2.215
Italy 294.9682 98.626 0.305 NA C C 20.444
Jamaica 7.3232 1.162 NA NA NA NA 0.923
Japan 39.593 NA
1015.1652 280.533 0.206 (2002) NA 51.313
Kazakhstan 75.879 18.734 0.052 NA NA NA 7.114
Korea 339.3
418.1545 79.859 0.089 91.00 (2004) 675.6 16.106
Luxembour 2.2425 1.669 0.215 NA NA NA 0.136
Mexico 245.51648 57.231 0.096 52.41 443.9 422.9 43.011
Netherlands 101.3445 24.875 0.243 NA NA NA 4.659
New 42.27544 9.376 0.164 NA C C 3.254
Nicaragua 3.41928 0.94817 0.172 NA NA NA 0.801
Norway 139.6553 30.788 0.164 NA NA NA 10.235
Panama 0.165 NA NA NA6.2431 1.654 (2007) 0.908
Paraguay 54.912 8.136 0.072 NA NA NA 2.914
Peru 31.9212 7.1577 0.134 NA NA NA 2.658
Poland 146.1054 32.677 0.193 79.20 486.8 NA 12.685
Portugal 43.0225 15.763 0.22 150.40 478.4 519.3 4.184
Romania 0.114 NA NA NA62.0285 21.753 (2005) 7.19
Russia 984.4903 224.2404 NA NA NA NA 109.24
Singapore 39.214 10.95 0.19 NA NA NA 2.107
Slovak 27.3309 7.357 0.22 NA NA 622.7 1.003
South 0.059 10.34
Africa 238.30278 44.0744 (2006) (2005) NA NA 0.02205
Spain NA 270.4
293.5026 93.525 0.218 (2003) NA 15
Sweden 145.0588 33.943 NA NA NA NA 10.985
Switzerland 64.3775 7.872 0.154 NA NA NA 4.317
Thailand 138.986 40.669 0.094 NA NA NA 8.954
Turkey 188.8392 41.818 0.165 32.34 999.2 572.0 27.481
United 82.32
Kingdom 361.8421 85.605 0.231 (2007) 533.4 358.8 28.195
United
States 4119.387 1010.172 0.113 46.99 603 362.4 245.88146
Source: EIA website (www.eia.doe.gov)
[Exhibit 12] Comparison of prices and demands






1 a.m.-4 a.m. 5 a.m.-8 a.m. 9 a.m.-12 p.m. 1 p.m.-4 p.m. 5 p.m.-8 p.m. 9 p.m.-12 a.m.
Hours of the day
Demand August - October 1998
Demand August - October 2000
Prices August - October 1998
Prices August - October 2000
Source: GAO, 2001
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